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Abstract 
Purpose – The study aims to examine the effect of natural resources, market size and 
five major institutional factors (voice and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption) on 
Chinese FDI in Africa.     
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses regression analysis on panel data 
across 22 countries for the period from 2008 to 2014.   
Findings – Natural resources did not play a significant role in attracting Chinese 
investments, but market size did. Among the institutional factors, only voice and 
accountability had a significant and positive effect on attracting Chinese FDI; the 
effects of rule of law and control of corruption were not significant; and political 
stability and regulatory quality had a significant and negative effect.   
Research limitations/implications – Chinese investment in Africa is only a recent 
phenomenon, and is growing rapidly, further studies should examine factors that are 
unique to the context such as bilateral political link.     
Practical implications – African countries that are struggling with improving their 
poor institutional quality in the short term could effectively attract Chinese investment 
by reducing investor psychic distance, e.g. establishing a closer political link with 
China. Nevertheless, in the long term measures of improving institutional quality are 
important.       
Originality/value – This study reveals for the first time that what attracts Chinese 
investment is market size rather than natural resources and different institutional 
factors of an African country show varying effects on attracting Chinese FDI.  
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Introduction 
China has become an important player in the global market due to its stable financial 
presence in recent years, and Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has 
increased steadily. China’s OFDI flow to Africa has grown from 317,430 million 
dollars in 2004 to 2,516 billion dollars in 2012 (Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2013). According to Ernest (2014), between 2007 and 
2013, the amount of FDI received from China accounted for 4.2% of Africa's total 
FDI. Compared with the amount of FDI contributed by other countries, China's 
contribution to Africa is not large (UAE - 12.1%; UK - 10.7%; US - 8%; India - 
7.3%). Within China's OFDI, the African market receives far less than the Asian 
market (11.5% versus 53.6% in 2014), which suggests that China’s FDI to Africa has 
an enormous potential for growth.1 African countries currently face three major 
challenges: slow growth, poverty and inequality (Sundaram, Schwank, & von Armin, 
2011). Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is important for the African 
countries to meet these challenges, because not only could it help drive the economic 
growth directly, but it could also facilitate technology transfer from developed 
countries (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Kahouli & Maktouf, 2015). 
Understanding the determinants of Chinese FDI into Africa thus becomes imperative 
for both theory and policy development.   
Empirical studies on the determinants of Chinese OFDI so far show inconsistent 
or even contradictory results, particularly with regard to the host country factors such 
as natural resources and institutional quality. Seeking natural resources is seen as the 
main motive for Chinese OFDI in less developed countries (Cai, 1999), but the 
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empirical evidence is equivocal. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) and Ramasamy, Yeung, 
and Laforet (2012) show that natural resources were a significant factor for Chinese 
investment, whereas Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013), Cheung and Qian (2009) and 
Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013) indicate the link was not significant. In Africa, 
accompanying cheaply available natural resources is often the poor institutional 
quality (Yang, Wang, Wang, & Yeh, 2017). Good institutional environment and 
political stability obviously could attract FDI inflow (Dunning, 1982), whilst Bevan 
and Estrin (2004) indicate that political stability is not an obvious determinant of FDI. 
Empirical results so far show contradicting evidence regarding institutional factors’ 
influence on Chinese OFDI. Several studies show that Chinese investors are 
particularly attracted to countries that have abundant natural resources with poor 
institution quality (eg. Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 
2012).  
This study therefore focuses on examining the effect of natural resources, 
market size and institutional factors on attracting Chinese FDI in Africa. The 
institutional quality includes five major factors: voice and accountability; political 
stability and absence of violence; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of 
corruption (Howell, 2011). These specific institutional factors may have different 
effect on attracting FDI (Bailey, 2017), therefore we examine them separately rather 
than in aggregate. Market size is included in our analysis, because it is another key 
factors of Africa to attract FDI other than natural resources (Asiedu, 2006), and 
Chinese investment could be driven by the market (Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2016). 
This study makes two major contributions to the literature. First, we reveal that 
what attracts Chinese investment is market size rather than natural resources  
Second, we found that and different institutional factors of an African country show 
varying effects on attracting Chinese FDI, from negative, not significant to positive 
effect. Moreover, unlike previous studies that are based data of short time period and 
limited sample size (e.g. Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012), we collected 
data for a relatively longer period from 2008 to 2014, with bigger sized sample that 
includes 22 African countries. We applied a method suitable for analysing panel date, 
the fixed-effect model to the panel data of 22 African countries. The remaining of the 
paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature on Chinese 
OFDI, and proposes three hypotheses for empirical test. Section 3 describes the data 
and methodology; Section 4 presents the estimation results and discussion; and 
Section 5 concludes.    
  
  
Literature review and hypotheses 
Natural resources and market size  
When profit-maximising firms face global competition, FDI is one of the 
outcomes of their strategic decisions (De Mello, 1999). Several factors may influence 
a firm’s choice of location for investment. As indicated by Dunning (1998), these 
factors into four main types: market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking 
and strategic asset-seeking. A country may attract more FDI if it has sufficient market 
size, abundant natural resources, low-cost labour or materials, or knowledge-related 
assets (Dunning, 1998). Natural resources and market size are the two factors that 
have received most attention in the literature on the determinants of FDI in Africa 
(Asiedu, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose & Cols, 2017).  
Previous studies in general indicate that natural resources are positively related 
to FDI inflow (e.g. Deng, 2004; Hong & Sun, 2006; Naidu, 2007; Ramasamy et al., 
2012; Renard, 2011; Sanfilippo, 2010; X. Zhang & Daly, 2011). As for FDI in 
African countries, Asiedu (2006) shows that natural resources are a significant factor, 
based on an analysis of panel data over the period 1984-2000. Frynas and Paulo 
(2007) also highlight that natural resources play a key role for attracting FDI. Using 
data specific to Chinese outward investment in the period 2003–2006, Kolstad and 
Wiig (2012) show that the poorer a host country is, the greater the attraction of their 
natural resources to Chinese investors. However, several researchers do not find 
evidence to support that seeking natural resources is the main motive of Chinese FDI 
in Africa. For example, Cheung and Qian (2009) indicate that although both market 
size and resource endowment are significant drivers of Chinese outward investment in 
general, but resource-seeking is not the main motivator for Chinese investment in 
Africa. Similarly, J. Zhang, Wei, and Liu (2013) show that Chinese private enterprise 
investors are motivated by Africa’s markets rather than its natural resources.  
The rapid growth of China’s economy in the past 30 years has triggered the 
country's demand for natural resources has increased dramatically. The Chinese 
government has encouraged OFDI as a tool to acquire sufficient supply natural 
resources to support the country’s sustained development (Ye, 1992; Zhan, 1995). As 
Kaplinksy and Morris (2009) argue, the resource-rich Africa is therefore the perfect 
investment location. Therefore, despite the discrepancies of the previous empirical 
evidence, it is reasonable to believe that natural resources play an important role in 
attracting Chinese investment. Thus: 
H1: The degree of natural resources of an African country is positively related 
to China’s FDI in that country. 
Consistent with the location theory proposed by Dunning (1998), empirical 
studies overall confirm the positive relationship between market size and FDI inflows. 
Asiedu (2006) examines data of FDI in Africa and demonstrates that the market size 
play a key role. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) investigate the determinants of Chinese 
outward FDI, and show that it is attracted to large markets. Using firm level-data, 
Chen et al. (2016) show a positive relationship between the market size of a host 
African country and Chinese FDI inflow. They argue that like all investors, Chinese 
investors seek profit maximization, thus prefer to invest in countries that have large 
market size. Thus:        
H2: The market size of an African country is positively related to China’s FDI 
in that country. 
 
Voice and accountability  
According to Howell (2011), ‘voice and accountability’ encompasses military 
involvement in politics and democratic accountability. As noted by Howell (2011), in 
the long term, a high level of military involvement in politics is likely to lead to an 
uneasy environment for foreign investors because it can generate corruption in the 
system of governance and can encourage an armed opposition. Busse and Hefeker 
(2007) found that there is a negative correlation between military involvement in 
politics and FDI after analysing a sample of 83 developing countries for the period 
1984 to 2003. Cleeve (2012) reports that this is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
Howell (2011) defines democratic accountability as how reactive a government 
is to its people, and explains that a less reactive government is more likely to fall, be it 
peacefully or violently. Kucera and Principi (2014) report mixed results showing that 
the effect of democracy varies across the industries. For the service and 
manufacturing industries, the effect is positive, whereas for the energy industry, it is 
negative. A few studies report a negative effect of democracy, such as Mathur and 
Singh (2013). However, most empirical studies report a positive effect of democracy 
and FDI inflow. For example, Rodrik (1996) found that US companies tend to invest 
in countries with high democratic accountability. Q. Li and Resnick (2003) also found 
that an increase in democratic rights can lead to an increase in FDI, although their 
results may be biased by their limited sample size and restricted sample period (Busse 
& Hefeker, 2007). Cleeve (2012) also supports this relationship, even if he believes 
that the result is not always robust. Jensen (2003, 2008) shows that the relationship 
between fundamental democratic rights and FDI inflow is significant. Rodriguez-Pose 
and Cols (2017) refer to ‘voice and accountability’ as an indicator of good governance 
that helps to attract FDI in Africa. Thus: 
H3: Voice and accountability of an African country is positively related to 
China’s FDI in that country. 
Political stability and absence of violence  
How political stability can affect the inflow of FDI is another contentious issue 
which has attracted much attention in previous research (Bevan & Estrin, 2004; 
Dunning, 1982). Political stability measures how likely the governments of host 
countries are to be destabilised (Howell, 2011). It can be affected by four main 
factors: government stability, internal conflict, external conflict and ethnic tensions 
(Howell, 2011). A higher level of political instability can make the host country less 
attractive to investors because it is generally associated with higher levels of 
expropriation, which may worry potential investors (Azzimonti & Sarte, 2007), and 
impede their commitment to investment (Büthe & Milner, 2008; Dunning, 1982; 
Schneider & Frey, 1985).  
Most scholars find that political instability is negatively related to the inflow of 
FDI (Cleeve, 2012; Naudé & Krugell, 2007; Qian & Baek, 2011; Ramasamy et al., 
2012), with one exception that Kolstad and Wiig (2012) find no significant 
relationship between political stability and FDI. In other words, the literature is 
generally agreed that political stability has a positive effect on FDI inflow. Thus:   
H4: Political stability and the absence of violence in an African country are 
positively related to China’s FDI in that country.  
Regulatory quality  
Regulatory quality measures the risks such as contract viability, profits 
repatriation, and payment delays (Cleeve, 2012; Gobinda Goswami & Haider, 2014). 
The degree of regulatory quality determines how likely foreign investors are to 
receive their proper benefits. Previous studies overall indicate that regulatory quality 
attracts FDI inflow. For example, Busse and Hefeker (2007) show that investment 
profile, an important measurement of regulatory quality, is positively related to FDI 
inflows at the 10% level, meaning the relationship is statistically significant. 
Chowdhury (2017) shows a significant and positive correlation between the 
regulatory quality of South Asian countries and FDI inflow. Gani (2007) provides an 
empirical analysis of 18 developing countries, including China, for the years 1996, 
1998, 2000 and 2002, and concludes that the regulatory quality of the host country 
has a positive influence on the amount of FDI they receive. Cleeve (2012) and Naudé 
and Krugell (2007) show that there is a positive correlation between investment 
profile and the inflow of FDI in African countries. However, according to Anyanwu 
(2012) and J. Li (2014), lower regulatory quality may not hinder Chinese investment, 
indicating that the effect of  regulatory quality could be insignificant. Therefore, an 
empirical test is required for the following hypothesis: 
H5: The regulatory quality of an African country is positively related to China’s 
FDI in that country.  
Rule of law  
Rule of law indicates the quality of legal systems and contract enforcement (Bailey, 
2017). It is often seen as a key factor affecting welfare, stability and growth (Belton, 
2005; Haggard, MacIntyre, & Tiede, 2008; Hiil, 2007); Janse, Sanchez Galera, and 
Liivoja (2007) Strong rule of law provides protection of property rights, reduces 
transaction costs for foreign firms (Khoury & Peng, 2011). Moreover, strong rule of 
law decreases uncertainty and improves firm’s efficiency and profitability (Bailey, 
2017). On the contrary, a lack of rule of law may lead to the liquidation of current 
investments, and this can deter potential investors (Hewko, 2002). Previous studies 
indicate that rule of law in general has a positive effect on the inflow of FDI (Du, Lu, 
& Tao, 2008; Gani, 2007; Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998; Khoury & Peng, 
2011). Studies that focus on African countries, such as those by Asiedu (2006), 
Cleeve (2012), Naudé and Krugell (2007) and Anyanwu (2012), also confirm this 
positive relationship. Thus: 
H6: Rule of law in an African country is positively related to the inflow of 
China’s FDI in that country. 
Control of corruption  
Control of corruption refers to how well host countries can control their corruption 
level. Corruption causes social uncertainty and can involve hidden costs (Kwok & 
Tadesse, 2006), which may have an indirect influence on the inflow of FDI. Empirical 
studies by Egger and Winner (2006), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Fung and Garcia-
Herrero (2012), and Egger and Winner (2005) support this argument. In the context of 
FDI in Africa, it is also found that high corruption levels deter FDI (Asiedu, 2006; 
Rogoff & Reinhart, 2003). In the case of China’s OFDI to Africa, the empirical study 
results are mixed. Cheung, De Haan, Qian, and Yu (2012) reveal a negative 
relationship between corruption and the inflow of FDI. However, Gu (2009) indicates 
that Chinese investors are not particularly concerned about corruption in the host 
country. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) explain that Chinese investors have experience of 
dealing with corruption at home and tend to invest in those countries with similar 
levels of corruption (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002).  
Therefore, the following hypothesis requires a further test. 
H7: The level of corruption of an African country is negatively related to the 
inflow of China’s FDI in that country. 
  
Data and method  
Table 1 presents all the variables used in this study. Table 2 summarises all the 
explanatory and control variables that this paper uses to test the hypotheses.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the stock of China’s OFDI to the sample of 22 African 
countries. The data source was Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment.  
Explanatory variables 
The main explanatory variables used in this study are: natural resources rent; market 
size; voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; regulatory 
quality; rule of law; control of corruption; infrastructure index/score; GDP; and trade. 
 Natural resources. Natural resources are measured using the index of the total 
natural resources rents (% of GDP) instead of the natural resources reserve in the 22 
African countries. As the World Bank explains, to build an analytical framework for 
sustainable development, the index of natural resources rents - the measurement of the 
percentage of the contribution of natural resources to economic output - is vital. This 
index is used because investors tend to be more interested in the profitability of 
natural resources rather than that of those on the ground (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). The 
data of natural resources rents are taken from World Bank databases because 'the 
group is guided by professional standards in the collection, compilation and 
dissemination of data to ensure that all data users can have confidence in the quality 
and integrity of the data produced' (World Bank).  
Market size. This study uses GDP as a proxy for market size (Asiedu, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2016; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012), and the data extracted from the World 
Bank and the unit used is US dollar. 
Voice and accountability. The index of voice and accountability summarises the 
effect of two factors: military involvement in politics and democratic accountability. 
The data of voice and accountability for this study are extracted from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by Political Risk Services (PRS). The ICRG, a 
methodology adopted by the PRS group, has been used by numerous researchers at 
various organisations, such as IMF (The PRS group). 
Political stability and absence of violence. This index includes four elements: 
government stability, internal conflict, external conflict, and ethnic tensions. The data 
are drawn from the ICRG by PRS. 
Regulatory quality. The data of regulatory quality are extracted from the ICRG 
by PRS.   
Rule of law. This is the measurement of the 'degree to which a country’s citizens 
have confidence in the law and comply with the rules of society' and it focuses on the 
quality of the host country's legal system (Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009). The data of 
this index are drawn from the ICRG by PRS. 
Control of corruption. The data of this index are also extracted from the ICRG 
by PRS.   
Control variables 
Three control variables are included in our estimation, namely inflation, infrastructure 
and trade. The extant literature suggests that these variables are some of the major 
relevant factors in attracting FDI. 
The first control variable is inflation. Investing in a foreign country with lower 
inflation rates can gain the investor a competitive advantage (Kleinert & Toubal, 
2010). We use the data of the GDP deflator (instead of the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI)) from the World Bank as a measurement of the inflation level of the 22 African 
countries being considered. According to  Baumol and Blinder (2008) definition, the 
GDP deflator is 'a broad measure of economy-wide inflation that includes the prices 
of all goods and services in the economy.' Also, Baumol and Blinder (2008) explain 
that the GDP deflator can measure overall inflation more successfully than CPI 
because the former is based on a market basket including all goods and services 
produced by the economy. 
The host country's infrastructure has a great role to play in attracting Chinese 
FDI, and is thus used as another control variable in this paper. The data of 
infrastructure index/score is from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). 
The third control variable used in this study is trade (% of GDP), found by 
many studies to have a strong correlation with the inflow of China’s FDI. Trade 
measures the percentage of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services in 
GDP. The data of trade that are collected from the World Bank database. 
Considering all the hypotheses, the main estimate equation of this study 
(including GDP, inflation, trade, infrastructure, voice and accountability, political 
stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) is as follows: 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎′𝑠 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖
=  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑉𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑃𝑉𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝑖 +  𝛽9𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
As is standard procedure in economic literature, this study applies the natural 
log transformation to the variables to produce straightforward regression coefficients. 
After the transformation, the estimate equation reads: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎′𝑠 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖
=  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑉𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑖
+  𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
One problem when analysing panel data is high correlation among independent 
variables, as this may cause multicollinearity. The correlation matrix shows whether 
the variables are correlated with one another. According to Table 3, those independent 
variables used in this paper used are not too highly correlated (<0.8). Therefore, 
multicollinearity should not be a problem for the estimation results and those 
variables may be used for this paper's regressions. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  
Results and discussion   
Hausman test. The Hausman Test ascertains whether the fixed-effect or the random-
effect model is more appropriate for the estimation. As Table 4 shows, the p value 
(Prob>chi2) of the Hausman Test is 0.0000, meaning the null hypotheses can be 
refused. In this instance, the Hausman test deems the fixed-effect model to be the 
more appropriate one. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents the main results from the regression of China’s outward FDI 
stock with the fixed-effect model, using six explanatory variables and four control 
variables. The Coef column shows the estimation coefficient for the equation. Also, 
the R-sq (0.77) shows that the fitted regression line is very close to the actual data. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Natural resources. The results as shown in Table 5 show that natural resources 
are not significantly related to China’s OFDI in Africa between 2008 and 2014. It 
suggests that seeking natural resources are not the main motivator for Chinese 
investors. Those countries with greater quantities of natural resources may necessarily 
attract more of China’s FDI. The result fails to support H1. However, it is in line with 
the findings by Cheung and Qian (2009), J. Zhang et al. (2013), and Blomkvist and 
Drogendijk (2013). It is in contrast with the findings by Wells (1983), Yamakawa, 
Peng, and Deeds (2008), Buckley et al. (2007), Kolstad and Wiig (2012), and 
Ramasamy et al. (2012).  
Market size. The result indicate that GDP and infrastructure, are strongly and 
significantly related to Chinese FDI, supporting H2. The finding suggests that 
Chinese investors are motivated by the market size and they prefer to invest in 
countries with less developed infrastructure. The results are not surprising as on the 
one hand, big market size indicating greater opportunities for investors. The finding is 
consistent with previous studies (Asiedu, 2006; Chen et al., 2016; Dunning, 1998; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2012).   
Voice and accountability. The regression result shows a significant and positive 
relationship between the voice and accountability of the 22 host countries and China’s 
OFDI stock, thus H3 was supported. The result is in line with the findings from most 
previous studies. For example, Busse and Hefeker (2007), Rodrik (1996), Cleeve 
(2012), Kucera and Principi (2014), and Q. Li and Resnick (2003) agree that an 
increase in a country's voice and accountability may lead to an increased inflow of 
Chinese FDI. 
Political stability and absence of violence. The result shows that political 
stability and absence of violence have a significant and negative relationship with 
China’s OFDI in Africa. Thus, H4 was not supported. This suggests that countries 
with greater political instability are more attractive to Chinese investors.  This 
finding is different from those of Büthe and Milner (2008), Dunning (1982), 
Schneider and Frey (1985), Azzimonti and Sarte (2007), and Kolstad and Wiig 
(2012). The coefficient is significant at the 10% level indicating that the negative 
correlation between political stability and China’s FDI flow to Africa is relatively 
high. The reason for this negative effect is probably is a political one, in that those 
political unstable African countries and China may have bi-lateral political 
agreements that help reduce the risks of Chinese investment (Qian & Baek, 2011).    
Regulatory quality. The estimation results indicate that regulatory quality of the 
has a significant negative influence on inward FDI flow from China (significance at 
the 5% level). Thus, H5 was not supported. The results contradicts many previous 
empirical studies, such as those by Busse and Hefeker (2007), Cleeve (2012), Naudé 
and Krugell (2007) and Gani (2007) who report a positive relationship between 
regulatory quality and FDI. However, this result is in line with the findings of 
Anyanwu (2012) and J. Li (2014) that the lower regulatory quality does not hinder 
China’s OFDI, because of Chinese investors’ psychic distance. As Blomkvist and 
Drogendijk (2013) point out, Chinese investors prefer to invest in countries with a 
similar cultural, economic and political environment. According to the data from the 
World Bank, in 2015, China’s regulatory quality index is 44, which is close to that 
held by Africa (30).   
 Rule of law. The result indicate that the relationship between rule of law and the 
flow of FDI from China was insignificant. Thus, H6 was not supported. It seems that 
when choosing investment destination countries in Africa, Chinese investors do not 
pay too much attention to the rule of law rating of host countries. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Daude and Stein (2007), but contradicts to those of 
Asiedu (2004); Gani (2007); Asiedu (2006); Anyanwu (2012) and Cleeve (2012) that 
there is a positive relationship between the two factors. This result does not support 
Slangen and Van Tulder (2009) and Naudé and Krugell (2007) who argue that rule of 
law is negatively correlated with the FDI inflow from China.  
 Control of corruption. The results show that control of corruption does not a 
significant relationship with Chinese FDI. Thus H7 was not supported. This 
contradicts the results of Wheeler and Mody (1992), Fung and Garcia-Herrero (2012), 
Egger and Winner (2005), and Habib and Zurawicki (2002) that control of corruption 
has a positive effect on inward FDI. This result is also surprisingly different from 
many empirical studies with a focus on Africa such as Asiedu (2006) and Rogoff and 
Reinhart (2003). However, it is in agreement with Gu (2009), who claims that China 
is not overly concerned with the corruption level of FDI host countries. It may be that 
China's own unusually high level of corruption (for a developed country) makes 
Chinese investors sympathetic to other countries with corrupt governments, or at least 
means that the prospect of corruption is not frightening (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012).   
 Control Variables. The result indicate that infrastructure has a negative 
relationship with Chinese FDI, which suggests that Chinese investors are motivated to 
invest in countries with less developed infrastructure, this is not surprising as many of 
Chinese investments are on infrastructure development projects. The other two 
variables the inflation rate and the trade index’ relationships with Chinese OFDI were 
insignificant. 
  
Conclusions 
This study attempts to uncover the factors that attract Chinese FDI in Africa, with a 
focus on natural resources, market size and institutional factors including voice and 
accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. A regression model was run on the panel data of 22 countries for the 
period from 2008 to 2014, with four other factors as control variables, namely, 
inflation, infrastructure and trade. The results show that what attracts Chinese FDI in 
Africa is a host country’s market size rather than its natural resources. [elaborate a bit 
more on this] 
Institutional factors of an African country show three different effects on 
attracting Chinese FDI. First, the study reveals surprising results that political stability 
and regulatory quality are negatively related to the Chinese OFDI. It is 
counterintuitive that Chinese investors prefer to invest in a politically unstable 
country. The reason for that could be the presence of a strong political relations 
between the politically unstable country and China, as suggested by Qian and Baek 
(2011). When choosing the destination of investments, many Chinese investors are 
often driven by political reasons, particularly large state-owned companies.   
Second, the rule of law and control of corruption have no significant effect on 
China’s OFDI. This suggests Chinese investors are not particularly concerned about 
weak legal systems or occupation in a host country. The reason for this could be due 
to the weak institutional factors at home country. Chinese managers have the 
expertise of coping with those weak institutional factors. The above findings imply 
that for those African countries that are struggling with improving their poor 
institutional quality in the short term, they could still effectively attract Chinese 
investment by reducing investor psychic distance, e.g. establishing a closer political 
link with China.   
Third, voice and accountability exerts a significant positive impact on the 
inflow of China’s FDI to Africa. This is an encouraging sign, as it implies that 
African countries that strive to increase their voice and accountability, could attract 
more of China's FDI. We could expect that in the long term, as the institution quality 
in China gradually improves, Chinese investors still prefer to invest in a country with 
good institutional quality.     
This study is limited to the data that Chinese investment in Africa is only a 
recent phenomenon, and the volume is relatively small compared to FDI from the 
developed countries. Nevertheless, the room for the growth of Chinese FDI in Africa 
is enormous. Further studies should examine the factors that are unique to the context 
such as bilateral political link between an African country and China.     
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